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INTRODUCTION
In the past fifteen years single-gender education, a model long
advocated by Jesuit schools,1 has been on the rise in public institu-
tions. Since the mid-1990s the number of single-sex public schools
in the United States has gone from two to over 500 in the forty states
with such offerings.2 This increase has been in large part a result of
a change in regulations under the No Child Left Behind Act,3 which
allows for, and even advocates, single-sex education.4 But how can
separation based on gender be permissible in a country where seg-
regation by protected classes such as race or gender has been deemed
constitutionally impermissible?
While many point to various psychological and pedagogical ra-
tionalizations for single-gender education,5 the legal answer can be
found in the 1996 Supreme Court case United States v. Virginia.6 This
seminal education case held that a publicly funded male college had
1. Carol Zimmermann, Single-Sex Schools: Public Schools Branch into Catholic
School Domain, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.catholicnews.com
/data/stories/cns/0606692.htm.
2. Tamar Lewin, Single-Sex Education Is Assailed in Report, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2011, at A19. This number includes both schools that offer single-sex classes and those
that accept students of only one gender.
3. Amy Novotney, Coed Versus Single-Sex Ed, 42 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 58 (Feb. 2011).
4. The Legal Status of Single-Sex Public Education, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SINGLE SEX PUB.
EDUC., http://www.singlesexschools.org/policy-legalstatus.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
5. See infra notes 98–123 and accompanying text.
6. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by denying admission to women.7 But the key conclusion many have
taken from this case is not that the denial of admission to women
was in itself unconstitutional.8 Rather, it was the failure of the insti-
tution to provide a separate program for women with the same offer-
ings, endowment, and general rigor of the male program.9 In essence,
the case held that separate-but-equal educational facilities for dif-
ferent genders are constitutionally permissible.10
The language of this conclusion should look familiar. The
“separate-but-equal” doctrine was first espoused in Plessy v. Fer-
guson,11 the famous 1896 case upholding a Louisiana statute forcing
white and non-white passengers to ride in separate railway cars.12
The 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education
expressly overruled Plessy’s holding in the education context.13 This
celebrated case held that separate schools for children of different
races were functionally unequal because such separation created a
“feeling of inferiority.”14 The question is, then, whether this separate-
but-equal doctrine, abolished in the context of race, is permissible
in the context of gender. Surprisingly, there have been virtually no
challenges to the United States v. Virginia holding, but as single-sex
education in public schools becomes more pervasive, we are likely
to see judicial action on the subject.15
This Note will proceed in six parts. Part I will examine the back-
ground of United States v. Virginia and the Court’s rationale for the
separate-but-equal holding. Part II will explore the ruling in Plessy v.
Ferguson and explain why it was overruled by Brown. Part III will
look at arguments both for and against single-sex education, exam-
ining whether gender is subject to the same problems as race with
regard to segregation in education. Part IV will map out the cur-
rent legal climate and recent related judicial challenges. Part V will
present my hypothesis of how the Court may review its holding in
United States v. Virginia, and how it should ultimately rule. Finally,
this Note will conclude with a look forward at the interaction be-
tween the Constitution and the national struggle to create a viable
and successful educational system.
7. Id. at 554.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 547–48.
11. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1896).
12. Id. at 540, 552.
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
14. Id. at 494.
15. See Lewin, supra note 2.
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I. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was founded in 1839, and
by the time the Court heard this case in 1996, VMI had a long and
treasured history of rigorous training for future male leaders.16 Al-
though many of Virginia’s higher learning institutions began as ei-
ther all-male or all-female, by this time VMI was the only remaining
single-sex public college.17 VMI remained financially supported in part
by, and thus under the control of, the Virginia General Assembly, and
it was therefore considered a state actor.18
It was on the basis of this state action that the United States
government filed suit in 1990 against Virginia and VMI on behalf of
a female high school student seeking admission to the school.19 The
United States alleged that the male-only admissions policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides in relevant part that:
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.20
The District Court for the Western District of Virginia undertook
a factual inquiry into VMI’s operations. The court found that some
women would want to attend the school if given the opportunity;21
that with recruitment VMI could achieve a ten percent female stu-
dent body;22 and that some women would be capable of all the activi-
ties required of VMI students.23 The opinion also cited the Supreme
Court’s holding in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, which
concluded that a government classification based on sex requires an
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”24 The District Court found, how-
ever, that VMI and Virginia had established such a justification by
showing that VMI added to the diversity of Virginia’s institutions,
and that admission of women would seriously alter the school’s
“distinctive method.” 25
16. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996).
17. Id. at 536–38.
18. Id. at 520–21.
19. Id. at 523.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va. 1994).
22. See id. at 1437.
23. Id. at 1412.
24. Id. at 1410 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
25. Id. at 1413.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with this
analysis, finding that such diversity was not a sufficient state policy
justification.26 In particular, the Court of Appeals pointed to the fact
that all the other public institutions of higher learning in Virginia
had become coeducational.27 Rather than ordering a change in VMI’s
admissions policy, the Court of Appeals recognized the changes that
would have to be made to the unique program as a result of admit-
ting women.28 They gave VMI three options: they could admit women,
establish a parallel institution or program for women, or abandon
their financial support from the state.29
VMI chose to pursue the second option. Under the court’s direc-
tion, it established a parallel program at the nearby Mary Baldwin
College, a private, all-female, liberal arts college.30 This program, how-
ever, differed significantly from the male program at VMI. At VMI,
the program strove to produce “citizen-soldiers” using the “adversative,
or doubting, model of education,” including “[p]hysical rigor, mental
stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute
regulation of behavior, and indoctrination of desirable values.” 31 The
program at Mary Baldwin, on the other hand, favored a “cooperative”
method of education; rather than participating in rigorous military-
like training, the students would participate in ROTC programs and
a “largely ceremonial” Corps of Cadets.32
The two programs also differed significantly in resources. The
academic quality of Mary Baldwin was lower than that of VMI, with
the average SAT of incoming freshman 100 points lower and with sig-
nificantly fewer Ph.D.s among the faculty.33 Mary Baldwin offered
degrees only in the liberal arts, while VMI had academic opportuni-
ties in the sciences and engineering.34 The difference in the financial
resources between the two schools was “pronounced,” as were the em-
ployment opportunities after graduation since the VMI students had
a large network of distinguished alumni at their disposal.35
The District Court found this parallel program to satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause, holding that Virginia and VMI were not
26. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 899.
28. Id. at 896–97.
29. Id. at 900.
30. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 526 (1996).
31. Id. at 522 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va.
1991)).
32. Id. at 527.
33. Id. at 526.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 552.
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legally required to “provide a mirror image VMI for women.” 36 The
court colorfully concluded that though the male program “marches to
the beat of a drum,” and the women’s program “marches to the mel-
ody of a fife,” it was the end of the journey that mattered, where “both
will have arrived at the same destination.” 37 The Court of Appeals,
though divided, affirmed the decision of the District Court.38 It rested
its decision on the conclusions that the option of single-sex education
was legitimate and important; the state’s action was “not pernicious”
and designed to exclude; it would be impossible to maintain the VMI
program with women integrated; and the educational opportunities
in each program were “sufficiently comparable.” 39 The Fourth Circuit
denied rehearing en banc.40
It was at this point that the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, holding that there were two
questions at issue in the case.41 The first was whether VMI’s exclu-
sion of women denied Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection to
those women capable of completing VMI’s program.42 The standard
used required the State to show that the classification served impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means were
substantially related to those objectives.43 Furthermore, the justifica-
tion could not be hypothesized or invented in response to litigation.44
Under this standard, the Court found VMI’s justifications un-
convincing. Justice Ginsburg dismissed Virginia’s argument based
on “inherent differences” between men and women, holding that these
are no longer accepted as justifications for classification based on race
or national origin.45 She did acknowledge the “enduring” physical dif-
ferences between men and women,46 but the Court held that these are
not an excuse for “denigration of the members of either sex or for ar-
tificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” 47 As for Virginia’s
argument based on VMI’s contribution to the diversity of its educa-
tional system, the Court claimed that the State had “not shown that
VMI . . . has been maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its
36. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 481 (W.D. Va. 1994).
37. Id. at 484.
38. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 1238–41.
40. United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995).
41. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530–31 (1996).
42. Id. at 530.
43. Id. at 533.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
46. Id.
47. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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categorical exclusion of women, educational opportunities.” 48 The
Court reiterated its standard of review, that the justification “must
describe actual state purposes” and not be based on “rationalizations”
invented after the onset of litigation.49 Under this lens of scrutiny, the
Court found nothing in the record indicating that VMI was founded,
and its all-male admissions policy perpetuated, in the “alleged pur-
suit of diversity.” 50
Virginia’s claim that VMI’s educational method could not be made
available to women in an unmodified form was also unconvincing.51
Pointing to the factual record from the first District Court proceed-
ing, particularly that “the VMI methodology could be used to educate
women” and “some women” were capable of all of VMI’s physical ac-
tivities,52 the Court held that a school “may not exclude qualified indi-
viduals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females.’ ” 53 Again, the Court was particularly dismissive
of gender-based stereotypes, pointing out that similar concerns about
female tendencies had long proven false for women in the legal and
medical professions, as well as in military academies and military
forces.54 The Court especially found distasteful the concept that women
could not share in VMI’s mission of creating individuals valuing edu-
cation, leadership, public service, and democracy, declaring, “[s]urely
that goal is great enough to accommodate women, who today count
as citizens in our American democracy equal in stature to men.” 55
Having determined that a Fourteenth Amendment violation had
occurred, the Court turned to the second question in dispute: “what
is the remedial requirement?” 56 The Court found that the creation of
the parallel program at Mary Baldwin was insufficient since it was
“different in kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible
facilities.” 57 The Court relied on the factual findings of the lower
courts to determine, as outlined above, that the Mary Baldwin pro-
gram differed from VMI in academic opportunities, facilities, re-
sources, and educational design.58 In this area, the Court found that
48. Id. at 535.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 536.
51. Id. at 540.
52. Id. at 540–41 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412. 1414
(W.D. Va. 1991)).
53. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women,
458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
54. Id. at 543–45.
55. Id. at 545.
56. Id. at 531.
57. Id. at 547.
58. Id. at 551–52.
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the Fourth Circuit had erred in their analysis of the different pro-
grams, explaining that “ ‘all gender-based classifications today’ war-
rant ‘heightened scrutiny.’ ” 59
The Court’s focus on the actual inequalities in the facilities,
rather than those inherent in them, produced the separate-but-
equal doctrine that has been the major takeaway from the case.60
But despite the prior declaration of this doctrine’s unconstitution-
ality in the context of race, the United States v. Virginia opinion it-
self makes a direct link to separation based on race, citing Sweatt v.
Painter.61 This 1950 case held it impermissible for a Texas law school
to create a separate facility, with much fewer resources, for African-
American students.62 The Sweatt case predates Brown, but the ques-
tion is whether its mention here indicates that gender shares key
qualities with race under constitutional analysis and whether these
shared qualities make Virginia’s separate-but-equal gender doctrine
untenable under Brown’s framework.
II. PLESSY V. FERGUSON AND BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
In 1892, Plessy, a man of one-eighth African heritage, purchased
a first class ticket on a train traveling from one Louisiana city to an-
other.63 He selected a seat in a coach reserved for white passengers
under a Louisiana state statute requiring passenger trains to provide
separate cars for different races; passengers were to comply with
this separation on penalty of fine or imprisonment.64 The conductor
ordered Plessy to move to a car reserved for “colored” passengers,
and when he refused he was “forcibly ejected” from the train and
arrested.65 After his arrest, Plessy challenged the constitutionality
of the Louisiana statute on the basis of both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.66
Under its Fourteenth Amendment analysis, the Court’s majority
found that this Amendment’s purpose was “political equality,” not
“social” equality or “a commingling of the two races upon terms un-
satisfactory to either.” 67 The Court drew a firm distinction between
59. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (quoting J. E. B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)).
60. See id. at 518.
61. Id. at 553.
62. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950).
63. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896).
64. Id. at 540–41.
65. Id. at 541–42.
66. Id. at 542.
67. Id. at 544.
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such “political” equality, including the right to sit on a jury, and
“social” separation in areas such as “schools, theatres and railway
carriages.” 68 As a justification for perpetuating this social segrega-
tion, the Court held that “[i]f the two races are to meet upon terms
of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mu-
tual appreciation of each other’s merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals.” 69 In short, the Court held that neither it nor the legis-
lature of Louisiana could “eradicate racial instincts,” and “[i]f one
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane.” 70
In a much-celebrated dissent, Justice Harlan disagreed vehe-
mently with the majority’s interpretation of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.71 Harlan concluded that these Amend-
ments were created not just to remove involuntary servitude and
legal inequalities, but “the imposition of any burdens or disabilities
that constitute badges of slavery or servitude.” 72 To show that the
railway car segregation constituted such a “badge,” Harlan argued
that the separation could not truly be equal, because the Louisiana
statute was not, as the majority assumed, “applicable alike to white
and colored citizens.” 73 This was because the statute’s purpose was
not, according to Harlan, “to exclude white persons from railroad
cars occupied by blacks,” but rather “to exclude colored people from
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.” 74 Because of this
underlying purpose, and the fundamental inequality of the separa-
tion, Harlan regarded the provision of “equal accommodations” to be
no more than a “guise” masking a threat to liberty and equality.75
As for the majority’s argument that the government could not
force races to comingle when they socially did not wish to do so,
Harlan looked at the other side of the coin, stating that “[i]f a white
man and a black man choose to occupy the same public conveyance
on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no government,
proceeding alone on grounds of race, can prevent it without infring-
ing the personal liberty of each.” 76 Harlan dismissed the majority’s
suggestion that “social equality cannot exist between the white and
black races in this country,” pointing out that two races sitting
68. Id. at 544–45.
69. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
70. Id. at 551–52.
71. Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 557.
74. Id.
75. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
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together in a railway car was not significantly different from two
races sitting in a jury box together or two races voting in the same
room.77 Rather, Harlan famously held that “[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind,” and no State legislation could “place in a condition of
legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now constituting
a part of the political community.” 78
Harlan’s dissent, however, was before its time, and the doctrine
applied to racial segregation in social institutions after this case be-
came the majority’s “separate-but-equal” analysis.79 For more than a
half century, courts held racial segregation in public places, including
schools, permissible as long as the separate facilities were determined
to be equal or substantially equal by the reviewing court. The majority
in Plessy had specifically mentioned schools as an example of a so-
cial arena in which segregation had long been permissible, holding
that “[t]he most common instance of [laws permitting separation] is
connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and
colored children.” 80 Other than to determine the actual equality of sep-
arate institutions, the Court did not examine the question of school
segregation until Brown.
In 1954, four cases from four different states—Kansas, South
Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia—came before the Court under the
heading of Brown v. Board of Education.81 In each of these cases,
African-American children had sought admission to schools in their
districts reserved for white children.82 The petitioners argued that the
laws in their states permitting racial segregation violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 As for Plessy’s
“separate but equal” rationale, the petitioners argued that such sep-
aration was “not ‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal.’ ” 84
In a unanimous and concise opinion, the Court agreed with the
petitioners and overruled Plessy.85 The Court found that the “tangible
factors” of the separate school facilities had been equalized. There-
fore, the question presented was not whether the schools were tan-
gibly equal, but whether the “segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
77. Id. at 561.
78. Id. at 559, 563.
79. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (invalidating the separate
but equal doctrine in the context of education).
80. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
81. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
82. Id. at 487–88.
83. Id. at 488.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 495.
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other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities[.]” 86
In a conclusion reminiscent of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, the
Court held that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘sep-
arate but equal’ has no place.” 87 It explained that while the facilities
of the schools might be equal, such separation based “solely” on race
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.” 88 The Court therefore abolished racial segregation in public
schools as “inherently unequal” and violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89
If “ ‘separate but equal’ has no place” in the “field of public edu-
cation” under the ruling in Brown,90 then why is such a standard per-
missible in the category of gender under the ruling of United States v.
Virginia more than forty years later?91 It is true that differences be-
tween the races are not exactly akin to differences between gender.
Sexual characteristics, for instance, are very obviously distinguished
between males and females. But the decision in Brown, and Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy, did not rest on the absence of actual physical dif-
ferences between citizens. They were based instead upon the “badge”
or “feeling of inferiority” 92 created by separation based solely on the
classification.93 Can separation by gender, like separation by race,
generate such a “badge” that any permitted segregation should be
outlawed under the ruling in Brown? The next section attempts to
answer this question by examining the different arguments for and
against single-gender education.
III. IS GENDER SEPARATION SUBJECT TO THE SAME
PROBLEMS AS RACE SEPARATION?
The legal arguments for and against gender segregation in
schools have their counterparts in historical, psychological, peda-
gogical and social science arguments. Some of these non-legal argu-
ments relate directly to the concepts of “feeling of inferiority” and
“inheren[t] inequal[ity]” pointed to in the Brown decision.94 Argu-
ments on both sides are persuasive, but advocates both for and
86. Id. at 493.
87. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
88. Id. at 494.
89. Id. at 495.
90. Id.
91. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996).
92. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
93. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
94. See id. at 494–95.
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against single-sex education have become more vociferous in recent
years as this education model becomes more common and permis-
sible.95 This section will examine non-legal rationalizations both for
and against this segregation.
A. Arguments in Favor of Single-Gender Education
Some proponents of single-sex education argue that, apart from
obvious physical differences between the sexes, there are important
differences in the ways that boys and girls learn.96 In some cases
these differences require different general approaches to teaching.97
Dr. Sax of the National Association of Single Sex Public Education
has claimed that boys require “energetic, confrontational classrooms,”
whereas girls require “a gentler touch.” 98 He is not alone in this claim;
his pronouncement reflects a common theme in this “gender differ-
ences” argument.99 Under this sort of “Mars vs. Venus” analysis, girls
are warm, agreeable, passive, and neurotic, but boys are aggressive,
assertive, and physical.100 The general acceptance of these sex differ-
ences has led many to develop and advocate different approaches to
educating and disciplining boys and girls, such as giving girls more
essay tests and giving boys more opportunities to move around.101
Other advocates argue that these gender differences need not be
so generalized, and in fact there are very specific, measurable gender
differences in learning.102 There have long been recognized sex differ-
ences in hearing due to differences in prenatal development of the au-
ditory cortex.103 Dr. Sax has argued that these physical distinctions
95. Kristina Gupta, Neurosexism and Single-Sex Education (or Support Your Local
ACLU), NEUROETHICS BLOG (July 24, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://www.theneuroethicsblog
.com/2012/07/neurosexism-and-single-sex-education-or.html.
96. Leonard Sax, Six Degrees of Separation: What Teachers Need to Know About the
Emerging Science of Sex Differences, 84 EDUC. HORIZONS 190, 195 (2006).
97. E.g., Galen Sherwin, “Science” Says No to Single-Sex Education, ACLU: BLOG OF
RIGHTS (Sept. 26, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/science-says
-no-single-sex-education.
98. Lewin, supra note 2, at A19.
99. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 96, at 194–95 (describing the difference in the way
teachers speak to their all-female classes versus their all-male ones).
100. E.g., Paul T. Costa, Jr. et al., Gender Differences in Personality Traits Across
Cultures: Robust and Surprising Findings, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322,
328 (2001).
101. E.g., Gender Differences Impact Learning and Post-School Success, COUNCIL
FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, http://www.cec.sped.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home
&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=6270 (last updated 2011).
102. See, e.g., Dennis McFadden, Sex Differences in the Auditory System, 14 DEVELOP-
MENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 261, 261 (1998) (noting that sex differences in the auditory
system are largely controlled by hormones).
103. See id. at 280–81.
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require different effective teaching strategies, specifically that boys’
teachers speak more loudly and that girls’ teachers eliminate back-
ground noise.104 Similarly, studies have shown that men and women
rely on vision differently,105 leading to the argument that boys typ-
ically require more visual learning than girls.106 Some even go so far
as to suggest that different genders learn best at different temper-
atures, because scientific studies have shown that the “ideal ambi-
ent temperature,” for adolescent males and females tends to vary by
about six degrees.107
Outside of the realm of physical science, some advocates claim
that single-gender education is necessary to produce advantages spe-
cific to girls. This affirmative-action-style argument points out that
girls are more likely to speak up outside of the presence of boys and
will not feel pressured to fulfill gender expectations of being timid or
retiring. One study has found that, in general, girls are far more crit-
ical of their academic performance, and boys tend to inflate their per-
formance and accomplishments.108 Data like this has presented what
many have seen as a need to build the academic confidence of girls
across the board, and single-sex education seems to do just that.109 A
report commissioned by the National Coalition of Girls Schools has
shown that single-sex education makes a statistically significant im-
pact on girls’ “self-confidence, political and social activism, life goals,
and career orientation,” as well as academic confidence and confi-
dence in traditionally male-dominated subjects such as math and
computer science.110 This study looked only at girls from different
educational backgrounds as they prepared to enter college, not af-
terwards.111 But many have made similar arguments regarding all-
female higher education leading to greater confidence and success
in adult life.112
104. Leonard Sax, Sex Differences in Hearing: Implications for Best Practice in the
Classroom, 2 ADVANCES IN GENDER AND EDUC. 13, 15–16 (2010).
105. E.g., Karen Chipman et al., A Sex Difference in Reliance on Vision During Manual
Sequencing Tasks, 40 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 910, 915 (2002).
106. E.g., Gender Differences Impact Learning and Post-School Success, supra note
101 (recommending supplementing visual aids in the classroom to effectively teach
male students).
107. Sax, supra note 96, at 193–94.
108. Eva M. Pomerantz et al., Making the Grade but Feeling Distressed: Gender
Differences in Academic Performance and Internal Distress, 94 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 396,
399, 402 (2002).
109. LINDA J. SAX ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: WOMEN GRADUATES OF SINGLE-SEX
AND COEDUCATIONAL HIGH SCHOOLS: DIFFERENCES IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND THE
TRANSITION TO COLLEGE 4 (2009).
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 2.
112. See, e.g., H. Kim Bottomly, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex Education, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.4, 2011, at A24. Bottomly is the current President of Wellesley College, one of the
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Some claim that this sort of “affirmative action” has already
achieved its goal and girls are no longer in need of this advantage.113
But rather than advocating for coeducational classes, some of these
education specialists continue to argue for single-sex education; their
claim is that boys require education tailored to them in order to catch
back up to the nation’s girls.114 This argument relies on recent re-
search showing that girls receive higher grades than boys; that boys
are more likely than girls to be referred for special education or diag-
nosed with learning disabilities; and that girls have been closing the
gender gap in math and science while boys remain far behind in read-
ing and writing.115 Educational programs tailored to boys, just as
those tailored to girls, could help close these academic gender gaps.116
Finally, some argue that separating the genders, particularly
in middle school and high school, takes sex out of the equation, mak-
ing learning a higher priority than wooing those of the opposite gen-
der in class. This is a justification that causes many parents to seek
single-sex placement for their children, particularly those of certain
faiths.117 This aspect of single-gender education has been shown to
have a particularly strong effect on girls, though not quite the convent-
like effect one might assume. One study found that young women in
single-gender schools, while less likely to become pregnant than their
co-educated counterparts,118 were more likely to be involved in het-
erosexual romantic relationships.119 According to one explanation,
heterosexual relationships in coeducational schools are more about
fulfilling roles in a social hierarchy than forming truly intimate re-
lationships.120 This social hierarchy, and the expectations that come
with it, seem to exist far less prevalently in single-gender schools.121
nation’s most famous and most successful all-female private colleges. Here, she claims
that “women’s colleges are a vital and vibrant part of the educational landscape and
should be offered to all young women as a choice.” Id.
113. See Richard Whitmire, Missed Opportunity, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/04/22/essay_criticizing_end_of_inquiry_into
_possible_bias_against_female_applicants_to_colleges.
114. See, e.g., MICHAEL GURIAN, THE WONDER OF BOYS 76–79 (1996).
115. See Gender Differences Impact Learning and Post-School Success, supra note 101.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Kim Thomas, In a Class of Their Own, NEW STATESMAN, Sept. 5, 1997,
at 27.
118. Advantages for Girls, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SINGLE SEX PUB. EDUC., http://www.single
sexschools.org/research-forgirls.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
119. But see Neville W. Bruce & Katherine A. Sanders, Incidence and Duration of
Romantic Attraction in Students Progressing from Secondary to Tertiary Education, 33
J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 173, 183 (2001).
120. See A.D. Pellegrini, Bullying, Victimization, and Sexual Harassment During the
Transition to Middle School, 37 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 151, 156 (2002).
121. Advantages for Girls, supra note 118.
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Essentially, it is easier for girls from a single-sex environment to say
“no.”122 Beyond the predictable problems with romantic relationships,
girls in various surveys have reported that they feel generally more
comfortable in their single-sex environments, because they are not
distracted by boys or the need to “worry about how [they] look.”123
B. Arguments Against Single-Gender Education
On the opposing side, some argue that single-sex education has
a negative effect because it reduces opportunities for boys and girls
to work together.124 Men and women must work together in the adult
world, these opponents argue, and boys and girls who have only been
in single-gender education will be unprepared for this cross-gender
interaction.125 The issue is that boys and girls will not only lack ex-
perience dealing with the opposite sex, but they will also lack the
experience necessary to treat the opposite sex equally.126 This says
something not only about these students’ future ease of interaction
and success, but also about the reinforcement of gender stereotypes
in adulthood and the workplace.
In the same vein, some argue that rather than allowing girls to be
more assertive or boys to be more passive, single-gender education
actually reinforces gender stereotypes in children.127 Specifically,
“[b]oys who spend more time with other boys become increasingly
aggressive,” and “girls who spend more time with other girls become
more sex-typed” as feminine.128 One study found that when more
gender-typing was done, such as having children line up separately
or use separate educational tools, children showed a greater gender
preference toward each other and the activities.129 This is not to say
that no model of single-sex education can work to reduce or eliminate
gender stereotypes, but research has shown that single-sex education
only works in this way if designed with “explicit gender transforma-
tional objectives.”130
122. Id.
123. Kibuchi Banfield & Elizabeth Negron, Single-Sex School Focuses Students on
Books, Not Image, Girls Say, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Dec. 9–15, 2004, at 22.
124. Diane F. Halpern et al., The Pseudoscience of Single-Sex Schooling, 333 SCIENCE
1706, 1707 (2011).
125. Novotney, supra note 3, at 58.
126. Id.
127. Halpern et al., supra note 124, at 1706.
128. Id. at 1707.
129. Id.
130. See NELLY P. STROMQUIST, THE GENDER SOCIALIZATION PROCESS IN SCHOOLS: A
CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 2 (2007); see also Lewin, supra note 2, at A19 (reviewing
recent research on single-sex schooling and its impact on the debate).
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In an argument parallel to those for race integration, many argue
that different genders do not learn any more differently as groups
than children of different races do. Neuroscientists have found very
little differences between post-natal female and male brains; what
differences they have found are not related to educational needs.131
Supporters of single-sex education continue to argue, as outlined
above, that data reflects the academic advantages of single-sex envi-
ronments. But the response is that these supposed advantages actu-
ally reflect the fact that most single-sex schools are private, with
ostensibly better programs than most public schools, and many even
require high performance on an academic test prior to admission.132
As far as the argument that girls need a sort of “affirmative
action” educational leg-up, some opponents argue that this is no
longer necessary. The “pendulum ha[s] swung,”133 they claim, and
now boys are performing worse than their female counterparts, as
addressed in the section above.134 Particularly in the area of higher
education, there are now substantially more women than men in
college and graduate school.135
The extent of these arguments boils down to a single inquiry:
whether the differences between girls and boys in our society merit,
and in fact encourage, gender segregation in schools; or whether
these differences are a fallacy that, subject to the dangers mounted
in Plessy’s dissent and Brown, should be struck from our legal and
constitutional allowances. We will turn next to the current legal en-
vironment for single-gender education, where the pedagogical and
scientific arguments often come into play.
IV. THE PRESENT LEGAL CLIMATE
In 2001, Congress enacted the so-called No Child Left Behind
Act in an effort to improve America’s failing public schools through
131. Halpern et al., supra note 124, at 1706.
132. Id.
133. See Lewin, supra note 2, at A19.
134. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
135. In 2006, two-thirds of colleges reported receiving more female than male applicants,
and 56% of American undergraduates were women. Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed.,
To All the Girls I’ve Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006
/03/23/opinion/23britz.html?_r=3. By 2011 this statistic had remained steady, if increas-
ing somewhat, with 57% of four-year degrees going to women; by this time, many colleges
had basically instituted affirmative action programs to enroll more men. See Whitmire,
supra note 113. In 2010 more women were earning bachelor’s degrees (by 7%), associate’s
degrees (28%), and master’s degrees (18%); more women were even graduating from
high school (3%). However, 43% more men were earning doctoral degrees. Educational
Attainment in the United States: 2010—Detailed Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2010/tables.html (last updated Apr. 26,
2011) (utilized in calculating the cited figures).
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a system of accountability and assessment.136 That same year, an
amendment sponsored by primarily female senators, including Hillary
Rodham Clinton, added the provision that “[f]unds made available to
local educational agencies under section 7211a of this title shall be
used for . . . [p]rograms to provide same-gender schools and class-
rooms (consistent with applicable law).”137 This amendment was
approved and added to the final law, along with a provision stating
that “[n]ot later than 120 days after” the No Child Left Behind Act
was enacted, the Secretary of Education would issue “guidelines” for
local agencies seeking funding for such programs.138 These amend-
ments legislatively codified the legal go-ahead for single-gender pub-
lic education that had been judicially declared five years earlier in
United States v. Virginia.139
While the Act required the Department of Education to create
regulations for single-gender education within 120 days of the Act’s
enactment,140 the Department did not issue these proposed regula-
tions until March 9, 2004.141 They were then amended and released
on October 25, 2006,142 and these regulations added new exceptions
and flexibility to single-sex classrooms, extracurricular activities, and
elementary and secondary schools.143 It is these 2006 regulations,
“Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” (hereinafter CFR),
which continue to govern single-gender education in public and pub-
licly funded schools today.144
Under the CFR, schools are permitted to offer single-sex class-
rooms as long as they fulfill three requirements.145 First, they must
provide a rationale for offering only one gender a particular course.146
Many rationales are acceptable, including a dearth of a particular
gender in an interest area.147 For instance, a school could offer a com-
puter science course for just girls based on the fact that so few girls
136. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425,
1439–40 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
137. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a) (2006).
138. Id. § 7215(c).
139. See 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(c) (2006).
141. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (Mar. 9, 2004) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. § 106).
142. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2008).




147. See The Legal Status of Single-Sex Public Education, supra note 4.
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had taken computer science in the past.148 Secondly, the school must
provide a comparable class in a coeducational setting at a location
with “geographic accessibility.”149 Thirdly, the school must conduct a
review every two years to ensure that the single-sex offering is still
necessary for whatever purpose that first prompted them.150
The requirements for entirely single-sex public schools are even
less stringent, arguably creating an incentive for single-gender edu-
cation to be school-wide rather than just in particular classrooms.151
Districts providing a single-sex school need only ensure that “ ‘sub-
stantially equal’ courses, services, and facilities” are offered at an-
other school within the district.152 These equal offerings, however,
do not necessarily need to be either coeducational or for the opposite
gender.153 A district could therefore have an all-girls high school and
a coeducational high school with no all-boys offering, for example,
or an all-boys elementary school and an all-girls elementary school
with no coeducational offering.154
Districts providing entirely single-gender schools also do not
need to provide any rationale for their offerings.155 It is apparently
considered sufficient that an entirely single-sex program is gener-
ally beneficial, as outlined in some of the arguments in the above
section.156 Districts providing entirely single-gender schools are also
not required, as are schools providing single-gender education in
only some classes, to conduct any kind of periodic review clarifying
their rationalization and purpose.157
This is the point at which single-gender education in the public
schools now stands: under United States v. Virginia and the CFR,
schools and classrooms can be single-sex as long as the excluded
gender has a comparable, or “separate but equal,” offering in the
same district. But as we have seen in the legal doctrine of Brown and
the non-legal arguments of many educational experts and academics,
this rationalization cannot stand unchallenged. This section will
now examine three different directions of attack on this doctrine—
academic, extracurricular, and admissions—and the successes and
failures seen by the few challenges in these areas in the years since
United States v. Virginia and the No Child Left Behind Act.
148. Id.
149. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2008).
150. Id.
151. See The Legal Status of Single-Sex Public Education, supra note 4.
152. Id.
153. 34 C.F.R § 106.34.
154. See The Legal Status of Single-Sex Public Education, supra note 4.
155. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34.
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34.
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A. Academic Challenges
Over the last year, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
has instituted many challenges against proposed single-sex schools
throughout the country. It seems they have been inspired, at least
in part, by the Science article cited above, which found scientific and
social arguments for single-sex education to be “misguided.”158 Due
to settlements and agreements, none of the ACLU’s challenges, which
have been resolved in three separate states, have reached a court.
These outcomes, however, can indicate the likely success similar
challenges would have before a judge.
Early in 2011, the ACLU filed suit against the school board in
Vermillion Parish, Louisiana, based on a middle school program that
split genders into different core curricular classes.159 The ACLU
alleged that the parish’s Rene A. Rost Middle School, in addition to
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, relied on “flawed data” and “gender stereotypes” and “had no
positive effect on academic performance.”160 In their settlement with
the ACLU, Vermillion Parish agreed to halt the program until at
least 2017 and not to institute any other single-sex programs for
just as long.161
A district in Wisconsin similarly put a halt to a single-sex
proposal after hearing from the ACLU.162 This proposed school in
Madison would have been a charter school exclusively for boys.163 At
first, the school board simply asked proponents to give them “scien-
tifically based evidence showing that separating boys and girls will
get educational results.”164 The main opposition, however, seemed
to be that a similar option was not available for girls, and the school
board permitted a new proposal for a school admitting both sexes but
then segregating them.165 The ACLU has called on the board again
to halt the new proposal until the school is entirely integrated.166
158. Sherwin, supra note 97.
159.  Louisiana School Board to Halt Single-Sex Classes After ACLU Intervention,




162. Sara Rose & Sue Frietsche, Following ACLU Demands Pittsburgh Ditches Single-
Sex School Plans, ACLU: BLOG OF RIGHTS (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.aclu.org
/blog/womens-rights/following-aclu-demands-pittsburgh-ditches-single-sex-school-plans.
163. Id.
164. See Sherwin, supra note 97.
165. Rose & Frietsche, supra note 162.
166. Id.
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The ACLU’s most successful challenge yet has been in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, where the school district agreed to drop gender-seg-
regated classes at a school for grades six through twelve.167 Because
it claimed the school’s model “promote[d] harmful sex stereotypes,”
the ACLU had threatened to file a complaint with the Department
of Education Office for Civil Rights.168 The gendered notions in this
program apparently went beyond those explored in the above sec-
tion on educational differences. For instance, the school’s program
included, according to the ACLU, boys’ lessons that built “character-
istics of warrior, protector, and provider,” and girls’ activities includ-
ing “applying and doing make-up [and] hair.”169 The school district
dropped the program before the ACLU had a chance to file their pro-
posed complaint.170
While none of these challenges reached a courtroom, and while
many of these schools may have acquiesced because they could not
afford an expensive law suit, the nature of the ACLU’s complaints
illustrates possible challenges based on the academic programming
in single-sex education.171 These challenges are based primarily, as
the ACLU has illustrated, on conflicting scientific, sociological, and
psychological evidence for “gendered” learning examined in the pre-
vious section.172 The focus has been, therefore, not on the potential
“inherent” differences that segregation could create, or the “badges”
of inferiority Harlan predicted in Plessy v. Ferguson,173 but on the
debate over actual differences.
B. Extracurricular Challenges
The CFR discussed above permits public schools to provide
single-gender extracurricular activities on the same terms that it
can provide single-gender classes.174 In no activity has this practice
been more contentious than in sports.175 As female athletics have
become more respected and acceptable in the past several decades,





171. Rose & Frietsche, supra note 162.
172. See supra notes 98–135 and accompanying text.
173. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
174. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 CFR § 106(b) (2008).
175. See, e.g., Rocio de Lourdes Cordoba, In Search of a Level Playing Field: Baca v.
City of Los Angeles as a Step Toward Gender Equity in Girls’ Sports Beyond Title IX, 24
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 144 (2001).
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forefront in equal protection analysis.176 Several challenges have re-
cently been brought reporting the failure of schools to accommodate
women’s athletics.177 In most part the courts here held in favor of
the athletes against the school.178 However, the doctrine of “separate-
but-equal” is by far the most prevalent in this area where the entire
inquiry revolves around the physical performance and capabilities
of each gender.
In 2007, three female athletes who had attended the University
of California at Davis brought suit against the University for failure
to provide equal athletic opportunities in the area of wrestling.179
The court granted summary judgment for the University, the plain-
tiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.180
On remand, the district court followed the state jurisprudence in hold-
ing that there is no equal protection right for one gender to join the
sports team of the other gender.181 Rather, it merely held that over-
all opportunities must be equal.182 However, it pointed to federal and
state cases declaring that there is a right to try out for a men’s team
if there is not a comparable women’s team, though this is no guaran-
tee of making the team.183 The court held the University liable for not
continuing the process it had begun in the 1970s of expanding their
athletic program to accommodate women such as the plaintiffs.184
In other athletics cases, the issue rested not on the obvious lack
of a women’s program, but rather on smaller inhibitions to women’s
teams.185 The paradigm of this type of case is Communities for Equity
v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, a dispute decided in
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.186 This was a class action suit
176. See Meghan M. Gavin, Leveling the Playing Field: Sex Equality in Athletics, 35
MCGEORGE L. REV. 445, 446 (2004).
177. Gender Equity in Athletics and Sports, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., http://feminist
.org/sports/titleIXb.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
178. See, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 974 (9th Cir. 2010);
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 693 (6th Cir. 2006).
179. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 961–62.
180. Id. at 962–63.
181. Id. at 970–71.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 970, n. 18.
184. Id. at 974.
185. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 679 (6th Cir.
2006).
186. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for this case in 2005, then remanded
without opinion for proceedings consistent with a recent ruling. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass’n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005). A recent ruling, which related to telecom-
munications, clarified a plaintiff’s means of redress under 42 U.S. § 1983. City of Rancho
Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005). The plaintiff in Cmtys. for Equity reap-
plied for certiorari after the ruling discussed in the text above and was denied. Mich. High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 549 U.S. 1322, 1322 (2007).
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brought against the state’s high school athletic association for sched-
uling their high school sports seasons in a manner discriminatory
towards female athletes.187 On remand, the court found that the ath-
letic association had violated the Equal Protection Clause by sched-
uling girls’ sports seasons during nontraditional and less advanta-
geous times of the academic year than those for boys.188 Applying a
standard of heightened scrutiny, the court failed to find that the
gender-based qualification served important state objectives and
that the means were substantially related to those objectives.189
In the context of athletics, the separate-but-equal doctrine is to
be expected. If pedagogical arguments pointing to physical differ-
ences between boys and girls are acceptable, then such arguments
in an area relying on physical performance certainly are as well.
The issue here relates more to the equal footings onto which these
programs are placed. As seen above, the courts do not often face, or
they side-step, the issue of integrating athletics for both genders.
However, a great deal of attention is paid to the existence of actual
equality of programs, perhaps because the area of athletics is one in
which women continue to be markedly disadvantaged as compared
to their male peers.
C. Admissions Challenges
There is very little jurisprudence relating to school admission
for a particular gender. However, as we have seen throughout the
cases on educational integration, the arguments against gender seg-
regation are highly connected to those against race segregation. The
most famous challenges to admissions practices based on protected
classifications have related to race, particularly addressing issues
raised by “affirmative action” in college admissions.190
The Supreme Court addressed this topic only a few years ago in
Grutter v. Bollinger.191 This case determined that, while public col-
leges may not create a point system in order to increase the number
of minority students admitted, they may take race into account dur-
ing the admissions process.192 The Court at the time believed this
decision would last another twenty-five years; this was the time esti-
mated it would take minority students to “catch up” sufficiently with
187. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 679.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 693.
190. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
191. Id. at 306.
192. Id. at 343.
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their white peers so that taking race into account for admissions
would not be necessary to promote diversity in higher education.193
Now, only nine years later, the Supreme Court stands poised to
address this issue again. The Court granted certiorari to the case of
Abigail Fisher, a white student who claims that the University of
Texas denied her admission due to her race.194 Fisher appeals from
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a district court rul-
ing in favor of the University.195 The state policy Fisher challenges
automatically admits the top ten percent of high school students into
the state universities.196 For the remainder of admissions, the pro-
cess allows race to play a role in the university’s decisions, as per-
mitted by Grutter v. Bollinger.197 Fisher, who was not in the top ten
percent of her class and to whom the University of Texas denied
admission, argues that Texas cannot sustain both a race-neutral ad-
missions standard and a race-conscious one.198
In finding for the University, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically upheld the ruling in Grutter, finding that racial diver-
sity in universities served state educational objectives of “[i]ncreased
[p]erspectives,”199 “[p]rofessionalism,”200 and “[c]ivic [e]ngagement.” 201
Recalling Grutter’s need for a “sunset provision[ ],” a periodic review to
determine if such diversity initiatives were still timely, the Court of
Appeals held that the University of Texas policies had not yet proven
unnecessary.202 In fact, the majority opinion posited that Justice
O’Connor’s twenty-five-year prediction in Grutter “may prove to be
more aspirational than predictive.” 203
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, seems to disagree, as it
stands poised to overrule Grutter by hearing Fisher’s case.204 The
Court did, in fact, find a racial classification impermissible in deter-
mining school admissions as recently as 2007, though it did not at
that time overrule Grutter.205 With Grutter overruled, the final bastion
193. Adam Liptak, Justices Take Up Race as a Factor in College Entry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2012, at A1.
194. Id. at A13.
195. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 213–14 (5th Cir. 2011).
196. Id. at 216.
197. Id. at 216–17.
198. Liptak, supra note 193, at A13.
199. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 220.
202. Id. at 221.
203. Id. at 222.
204. Liptak, supra note 193, at A1.
205. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007).
This case dealt with assigning children to different schools based on race in order to pro-
mote cross-neighborhood diversity. The Court held that Grutter did not govern this case,
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of taking race into account for public education purposes would be re-
moved.206 It would only be a matter of time, then, for the Court to move
on to the next integration challenge facing public education: gender.
V. THE NEXT CHALLENGE
As we have seen in the above section, challenges to single-sex
education have involved academic, extracurricular, and admissions
aspects of the programs. But as these single-gender programs become
more prevalent based on their supposed academic credentials,207 I
believe the next challenge the Supreme Court addresses will be
academic. Most likely, this challenge will relate to the permissibility
of single-gender education set out in the CFR, and it will come from
a civil rights organization such as the ACLU. The Court, when this
challenge comes before it, should write an opinion overturning the
separate-but-equal doctrine in United States v. Virginia, putting
into place a better and more accurate understanding of the ruling
in that case.
As we have seen in United States v. Virginia, the standard the
Court applies to gender classifications is that of heightened scru-
tiny.208 This requires the state to show what has been called an
“exceedingly persuasive justification.” 209 The state must show that
the classification “serves ‘important governmental objectives,’ ” and the
means used are substantially related to those objectives.210 The Court
should find the state objectives in this hypothetical case lacking.
The state objectives put forth here would relate to providing an
effective educational system for their students. The state could argue
the many pedagogical and scientific arguments supporting better
academic outcomes for students in single-sex environments.211 These
arguments, however, are likely to fall flat, as the challenger can easily
counter with conflicting expert evidence as to the educational effec-
tiveness of these methods.212 Having likely just overruled Grutter v.
Bollinger,213 the Court will not be keen to accept even those arguments
and instead reaffirmed Brown by finding such calculations based on race impermissible.
Id. at 707.
206. At the time that this Note went to print, the Supreme Court had not yet rendered
an opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.
207. See supra notes 2, 98–123 and accompanying text.
208. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 518 (1996).
209. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citing Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
210. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
211. See supra notes 98–123 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 124–35 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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that one or the other gender needs a “leg-up,” since the genders are
arguably more equalized in American society than members of dif-
ferent races. The state could also argue that single-gender offerings
contribute to the diversity of offerings within the system, but United
States v. Virginia specifically rejected that justification.214
The state could then argue that these programs provide equal
though separate opportunities to students of different genders, fol-
lowing the Court’s ruling in United States v. Virginia. The challenger
could respond to this assertion in two ways. First, they could argue
that, in many cases, the offerings are not actually equal, and part
of their supposed pedagogical effectiveness is based on them not be-
ing equal.215 For instance, they can point to programs such as that
squashed by the ACLU in Pennsylvania, which focused on teaching
boys to be a “warrior” and teaching girls important topics such as
“make-up.” 216 In addition, the CFR seems almost to encourage this
kind of abuse by providing for a very wide range of justifications in
their regulations, in some cases requiring no justification at all.217
Alternatively, the challenger can argue that the tangible equal-
ity does not make a difference under Brown’s analysis, because such
separation of girls and boys is inherently unequal.218 The dissent in
Plessy pointed out that separation of two groups for the benefit of
both was just a “guise,” because it was indeed for the benefit of just
one.219 Most persuasively for the challenger, the unanimous opinion
in Brown held that “[t]he ‘separate but equal’ doctrine . . . has no
place in the field of public education.” 220 It does not matter which
particular group is being disenfranchised, and it should not require
an inquiry into the status of each gender in American society; the
danger is the potential for a “feeling of inferiority” to develop on
either side of the equation, making these school opportunities in-
herently unequal.221
Taking its prior rulings and the appropriate standard of scru-
tiny into account, the Court should find in favor of the challenger. The
Court should reaffirm its celebrated opinion in Brown, and rather
than overruling its opinion in United States v. Virginia, it should clar-
ify it. In that case, the Court really meant that men and women, boys
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and girls, are capable of the same educational achievements, and they
should not be denied the opportunity to achieve them.222 Contrary
to its popular understanding, United States v. Virginia revived Brown
rather than Plessy in the context of gender. The separate-but-equal
doctrine for gender in public education should be abolished, and the
CFR regulations altered in order to require the most “exceedingly
persuasive” justification for such separation in any form.223
CONCLUSION
Much of the debate surrounding single-gender education has
rested upon the differences between the genders themselves. This
seems to place this question within the larger framework that has
consumed the nation for decades, and especially the past several
months: the question of how men and women are equal, and how
they could be so unequal as to justify a difference in political intru-
sions and civil rights. With political discourse remaining steadily
vitriolic in the areas of abortion, contraception, and women serving
in the military, there are vociferous arguments on both sides of the
controversial idea that “[b]iology is destiny.” 224
But this issue in public schools is less about the current political
gender climate and more about what we need to do for our education
system. In its challenges to single-sex programs, the ACLU has fo-
cused on the idea that this gender segregation is nothing more than
“quick-fix gimmicks,” or a “misguided experiment.” 225 While under-
standing that there is a “critical need for better educational options,”
the ACLU believes, and it is not alone, that single-sex programs are
not among them.226 Here, the ACLU is getting at the root problem
beneath the wide-spread implementation of single-sex programs in
recent years: the American educational system is in desperate need
of some kind of solution. With public education in its current state,227
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it is no wonder that schools are looking for some new program—any
program—to better prepare their students. The science supposedly
behind single-sex education seems to provide this. With this tool,
educators might hope to prove that the poor academic showing of
American students is based, not on a broken system, but on the
failure of individual educators to provide gender-tailored teaching.
Jesuit and other private schools have, after all, been using this ped-
agogy for many years with notable success.
As the ACLU points out, however, these higher-performing pri-
vate schools have many other distinctions from public schools that can
explain their students’ higher performance: “extra resources, smaller
class size, and an academically focused curriculum” among them.228
There can be no debate that these school attributes lead to excellent
educational results. These modifications in the public schools would
produce uncontroverted academic improvements for every kind of
child, and they do not present any constitutional problems.
This is not to say that single-sex education does not have its
merits. I myself attended an all-girls high school and an all-women’s
college, and I found the experience extremely rewarding and benefi-
cial. But the program is not for everyone, and in its current incarna-
tions it is not constitutionally permissible as a public school option.
There is too much risk of abuse; there is too much danger that
“badges” of inferiority will develop, regardless of which gender bears
the brunt of the blow.229 Public schools seeking solutions should look
to other successful modeling—programs that apply equally to both
genders—in order to improve upon a struggling system.
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